The question that animates this paper is deceptively simple: what is brought into 'play' in the conjunction of the signifiers 'Britishness' and 'Otherness'? Is the coupling of these two terms merely a taxonomic convenience, a way of marking out apparently fixed, mostly immutable categories such as 'nation', 'cultural practice', 'ethnicity' and 'Empire'? Or, conversely, is the opposition of 'Britain-as-subject' and its panoply of archipelagic and colonial 'objects' essentially a tactical manoeuvre driven by ongoing investments in a particular kind of narrative economy? Does the narration of nationhood, in spite of the multiplicity of standpoints or cunning segues in time and location the historian evokes, always and inevitably depend on the persistence of specific rhetorical structures? To wit, a teleological orientation, the working out of time via the trope of linearity and, most significantly, an abiding motif of the nation as a 'sovereign ontological subject'. 1 As Edward Said notes in the introduction to Culture and Imperialism, 'the power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism and one of the main connections between them.' 2 If we were to trace this distinction between Britishness and Otherness inward from where we imagine the boundary of its 'outside' to be, an alternate series of questions would be provoked. How does the figure of the Other function to authorise specific conceptions of Britishness? Through what discursive techniques is the Other inaugurated and sustained? Is the Other only ever rendered strategically, as a cipher in a great cryptogram of imperial nationhood, or does it endure as a definitive (and therefore representative) presence? How can political and epistemic power be seen to operate in the critical separation of Britishness from its absolute exterior, the tyranny of its vast 'not-self'?
The conundrum of Britishness and Otherness is always and already a problem of the line and the boundary. That which presents itself as denotatively simple and grammatically efficient -the apparently modest copula 'and' -drives the terms Britishness/Otherness both together as an 'irreducible conceptual pai[r]' 3 and apart in their 'seemingly clear-cut oppositio[n]'. Drawing the two signifiers toward one another, the 'and' occupies a (non) space that is both constitutive of the opposition, but also absolutely outside of it. Considering the function of the frame (or boundary) in painting, Jacques Derrida observes that it is neither in, nor of, the work itself. Where the frame, or parergon, delineates the boundary of the work (ergon), it is already a 'hybrid of outside and inside' 4 that 'disconcerts any opposition but does not remain indeterminate'. 5 This dynamic repeats itself ceaselessly in discourses of power and privilege, its light throbbing pulse a reminder that the two halves of any opposition cannot be knifed apart arbitrarily, as much as it may appear far easier, in a conceptual sense, to do so. The border (or 'frame', or the 'and' or the 'outside') cannot be peeled away and discarded. Derrida's theory of framing serves as a reminder that meaning is already deeply implicated in inside/outside relations, and, as such, defies a finite point or limit.
Where does Britishness start (if it is not already impossible to proffer the question)? Is it an identity, a mode of being in the world, confined solely to 'a group of cultures situated along an AngloCeltic frontier and marked by an increasing English political and cultural domination'? 6 Can such an 'archetypal' conception of Britishness, based on geo-political boundaries and cultural hegemony, be read productively against a narrative of Britishness as an unstable amalgam of (post)colonial difference? When the internal boundaries of Britishness (between the four significant white-skinned ethnic groups -the English, Scots, Welsh and Irish -and 'white' and 'non-white' racial groups in the contemporary multi-culture) are juxtaposed with those 'quasi'-British identities that proliferated on the 'external frontiers' 7 of the Empire ('non-white' colonised citizens and 'white' settler classes), a plethora of edges, axes and borderlines is generated. As these lines intersect, fuse and fracture, each boundary becomes progressively 'fuzz[ier]'. 8 My explorations in this paper respond to the difficulties inherent in working productively with binary forms of identity. Who is 'British'? Who is 'Other'? Is it possible to delimit both the inside and outside of this opposition accurately? In putting Britishness and Otherness back 'in play', I also mean to consider whether the invocation of the Other in this context is merely an opportune appropriation of post-structuralist idiom, or, potentially, a way into a methodology useful for thinking through what was at stake in the prohibition of particular identities within the Empire. As a way into the Britishness/Otherness dyad, I will consider the account of the emergence of British identity offered by Linda Colley in her essay Britishness and Otherness: An Argument. 9 My aim is to engage Colley's historical speculations in conversation with critical strategies and theoretical frameworks advanced in disciplines such as Cultural Studies and Whiteness Studies. I contend that such a dialogue will disrupt the opposition of the 'concrete' with the 'abstract' implicit in the dichotomy of Britishness and Otherness and allow for the exploration of minority white identities that are often under-explored in existing histories of the period.
I come to the disciplinary concerns of 'History' as cultural theorist in pursuit of the perversely obvious -that is, white people. The relation of 'History' to 'Theory' (also capitalised and rigorously disciplinary) could be described politely as fractious. History, as broadly artifactual and focused on the production of truthfulness, is apparently antithetical to the entirely more sceptical, more contestatory style of theoretical conjecture. Where theory looks for 'histories', entertaining partiality and a certain 'epistemic insecurity', 10 history perceives relativism, and an 'atmosphere of permissiveness toward questioning the meaning of historical events'. 11 While I am guilty here of exaggerating the dialectical relation of history and theory, there are certain central difficulties that must be admitted when attempting to put history and theory in conversation. 'The writing of history', asserts Prasenjit Duara 'is antitheoretical, first, because it is the principal means of naturalising the nation-state as the container of, or the skin that contains, the experiences of the past.' 12 How would the writing of history, the knitting and stretching of the nation's 'skin' with all the stark, primordial connotations that this image evokes, operate differently, extraordinarily?
Curiously, there seems to be an emerging consensus that theoretical imperatives do not change the work of history -the immersion in archives, the close reading of primary source material, the ethical imperative to account for the past and the dead -but alter the relationship of the historian with the act of narrating. 'To conceive of difference in the past', write Ann Curthoys and John Docker, quoting Foucault, 'is to conceive of the Other in the time of our own thought. And that means we must recognise that the historian too is not unified within himself, he is not a sovereign subject whose consciousness is fully knowable to himself.' 13 The subject who doesn't experience her capacity to know as concretising, as a measure of full and complete presence, may perhaps persist more readily with the differences and contradictions that haunt all ideologically encoded attempts to explain human experience. To turn to Duara again briefly: 'Theory is useful to me not because it illuminates a hidden truth freed by the death of the past. Theory illuminates the object because it provokes the historian as subject.' 14 The search for specific ethnic identities at work in Imperial Britain, albeit as part of a broader enquiry into whiteness and racial superiority more generally, has prompted me to ponder who, or what, was authorised at the time under the sign of Britishness. At the zenith of the Empire, in the heart of its metropole, could a subject possess white skin, but still not be British? The study of white racial and ethnic identities has gained steady currency in the academy over the last 20 years, but it has only been in the past decade that such work has precipitated the naming of a specific field of enquiry with a discernable critical mandate. These investigations are now generally referred to, with or without an ironic inflection, as whiteness studies. Whiteness Studies responds to the surge in anti-racist scholarship that followed social and political fluctuations across the globe post-World War II. Most directly and significantly, it references the civil rights movement in America in the 1960s. As such, this work addresses three core considerations. Firstly, it contends that a significant number of white-skinned people do not accept that they are raced. Furthermore, whiteness is seen to persist as a position of socio-cultural and political invisibility or neutrality, despite the fact that it enables some subjects to achieve highly visible and discernable levels of privilege. Finally, whiteness studies recognises that subjects who are interpellated as white exercise significantly greater discursive and material power than those who are not.
Whiteness is frequently equated with a sense of everydayness. The white subject, in terms of both corporeality and cultural efficacy, becomes hypernormalised and is rendered invisible against an expansive landscape of visible fetishes 15 -subjects who do not sign, and are not signed back, as white. Thus it has been the project of whiteness studies to address the problem of whiteness as invisibility, its condition, described by Toni Morrison as 'mute, meaningless, unfathomable, pointless, frozen, veiled, curtained, dreaded, senseless and implacable', 16 by making visible its effects; to counterbalance the omnipresent 'nowheres' that whiteness seems to emanate from by recovering the 'somewheres' in which it can be seen to be operating.
There has been a torrent of work that considers the formation of white identities in the United States. Studies such as David Roediger's The Wages of Whiteness, 17 which assesses how the American working classes progressively 'whitened' in response to the entry of African-Americans and successive waves of immigrants into the free labour market, and Noel Ignatiev's work, How the Irish Became White, 18 which charts the progression of Irishness from a marginal non-white identity to its interpellation in the normative white centre, have established the conditions for a thoroughgoing analysis of occluded racial identities. However, the paradigm of American racial analysis does not translate easily or necessarily effectively between continents or histories. Issues of race, as framed in the American context of slavery and the civil rights movement, stand more clearly delineated -the problem of whiteness is heightened, energised even, through its proximity to the 'absoluteness' signified by black skin. Such circumstances are not mirrored as acutely in midnineteenth century Britain. Absolute racial difference is an experience confined largely to the colonial periphery. Instead, there are four main ethnic groupingsthe English, Scots, Welsh and Irish who apparently do not differ phenotypically, that is at the level of biological body, but who experience the non-biological or inscriptive body differently. This intersection of the biological with the inscriptive is interesting and relevant because it disrupts and complicates three significant analytical assumptions currently inherent in whiteness studies. The first of these is that the possession of white skin in and of itself equates to privilege. The second is that all subjects coded and interpellated as white enjoy equal access to specific practices of behaviour, gesture and signification that produce cultural and material power. Finally, Whiteness Studies often presumes that a practice of whiteness must be ascribed limits by a co-existing practice of 'blackness' or 'non-whiteness' (i.e. a literal and symbolic difference based on skin).
As someone who is interested in the production of what is broadly, and sometimes glibly, termed 'identity', I am acutely aware of the tension in play between my own post-structuralist inclinations (the drive toward ways of reading and questioning that are 'polytopic and supple') 19 and the simultaneous desire for a 'thick' historical understanding grounded in evidence. In seeking to think through the implications of Britishness as an identity, or set of complementary identities, governed by specific set of prohibitions and interdictions, I don't assume that identity is merely a synonym for culture, or that all inquiries into identity are primarily cultural. Identity is, to steal a phrase from Foucault, the 'strategic elaboration' over time of the interplay between the cultural, social and political. Thus, the examination of identity should be able to support the analysis of vectors such as class, race or gender without requiring that one necessarily be subordinated to any other. * * * * * Linda Colley's article, 'Britishness and Otherness: An Argument' appeared in the Journal of British Studies in 1992, shortly after the publication of her monograph Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837. 20 I am interested in Colley's work not only because of the status that the book has amongst work which assesses the emergence of Britishness as a national identity, but because her article 'Britishness and Otherness' is one of the very few that directly couples these terms together and presents them as mutually constitutive.
Colley's article opens on Viscount McCartney of Dervock, emissary of George III to the Chinese Emperor Ch'ien-lung, shivering in the dark, blank hours of a freezing autumn night. McCartney's mission to China was predominantly an economic one. As the first representative of the British government in China, his mission was threefold. Firstly, he was to persuade the Emperor to accept a permanent British embassy. Secondly, he was to negotiate expanded strategic and trade opportunities for the East India Company by attaining permission to establish trading posts at strategic points on the Chinese coast. Lastly, it fell to him to convince the Emperor that the quality and ingenuity of British manufacturing was such that mass importation should be permitted. 21 However, despite a reciprocal giving of gifts and a lavish state reception, Chi'en-lung was impervious to the British proposals and assurances of mutual benefit. Colley records that McCartney, an Ulster Scot, and his retinue (comprised variously of two Scotsmen, a protestant Irishman, a Welshman and a Kentish artist amongst others whose ethnicities are not specified), were, despite their differences in country of origin and background, 'united by anger and by something more. In the presence of an alien and contemptuous culture, they felt all of a sudden intensely British, brought together, almost despite themselves by confrontation with the Other.' 22 This diplomatically unproductive encounter between Orient and Occident functions as a primal scene in the concretisation of Britishness. The implicit menace of the foreigner operates to erase any prevailing differences between the Britons themselves -ethnicity, provincialism, and even distinctions related to class are annihilated in the refusal of the non-self to return the gaze and appropriately interpellate the white presence. Britishness, according to Colley, is thus inaugurated and sustained by the presence of threat. As a supranational identity, Britishness is applied, template-like, across regional differences and affiliations, effacing the anomalous experiences of Highlander and Lowlander, northerner and southerner, the rural and the metropolitan. Although Colley stresses the necessarily artificial and contingent nature of British identityher term for it is 'forged' 23 with its curious double association of shaping/hammering and duplicitousness and trickery -it enables suspiciously organic political manoeuvrings against the potentially hostile stranger. Such manoeuvrings are not, she asserts, 'imposed from the centre and not an anglicisation of the Celtic fringe', 24 nor are they consequent on the integration or homogenisation of the internal cultures of the United Kingdom. Thus, what Colley's analysis requires is a metanarrative point of identification which can accommodate the vicissitudes of the three nations she considers generative to Britishness, namely England, Scotland and Wales. That point of reconciliation is Protestantism.
In Colley's schema, Protestantism sutures the potentially fractious English, Scots and Welsh together as a representative British presence against the menace of Continental Catholicism. 25 She argues that it was the continuing threat of French invasion throughout the 100 Years War, combined with the lesser, but still conceivable, possibility of a Jacobite incursion through Scotland that transcended national and ethnic boundaries within Britain. The French Catholic threat required that Britain adopt a war footing; Colley notes that at the War of Spanish Succession, which culminated in 1713, the British army constituted some 130,000 men. By 1815, in the aftermath of Waterloo, the national army plus the militia and East India Company numbered one million men, or one in five of the adult male population. 26 This war machine was nourished by state propaganda that both reiterated the inside/outside opposition and simultaneously supported the contradistinction of Protestantism and Catholicism. With an emphasis on both the circulation of familiar stereotypes and the clear delineation of good and evil, this inculcation acted to quicken the national narrative.
The national narrative is seen to be strengthened again, recast or forged anew, in the pursuit of Empire. Colley is careful to distinguish between the 13 American colonies, which she designates as the 'English' empire, and the later 'British Empire'. The British Empire is characterised not only by its sheer territorial reach, but also by the participation of Scots, Scots-Irish and Anglo-Irish in its administrative ranks in rates disproportionate to the percentage of population they represented within Britain itself. Inevitably, the Empire is invoked as a differential space against which Britishness could cohere. 'Britains could join together vis-à-vis the Empire', writes Colley, 'and act out the flattering parts of heroic conqueror, humane judge and civilising agent.' 27 What the colonised, particularly the Irish, might have felt of their part in the shoring up of an enduring British national sentiment is apparently in excess of the argument's scope and capacities.
Thus far Colley has presented Britishness as one element in a dichotomous relation. As a category, it inheres only in the presence of that which is outside, and in surfeit, of it. The binary is a treacherous, if compelling, form of thought. Not only is it governed by the logic of the excluded middle, whereby something is or isn't, but it can never simultaneously be and not-be.
That is, you could be British, or you could be Other, but never both British and Other. The binary is ultimately hierarchical, privileging one element over and above its pair, most usually the term cited first. This inversion reveals the Other as only ever supplementary, as constantly and inevitably exchangeable. As Michel De Certeau observes of modern Western historiography, 'intelligibility is established through a relation with the other; it moves (or "progresses") by changing what it makes of its "other" -the Indian, the past, the people, the mad, the child, the Third World'. 28 In the context of Colley's narration of Britishness, the chain of substitutions reveals itself: China is erased by Catholics who are in turn supplanted by the indigenous populations of the Empire. The Other, therefore, cannot have the quality of a thing-in-itself. It can only suggest the proliferation of a boundary, the uncertainty within a liminal space. The Other is only ever figurative and thus partial. Where the centre (the British) is possessed of a metaphysics, the periphery is construed as entirely metonymic and so depredated of representative presence.
The effects of binary thinking cannot be circumvented by inversion. Privileging the secondary term does not, by default, dissolve the first. Thinking through the deployment of terms such as 'Self and Other', or the corollary opposition of 'centre and margin', is neither a comforting or necessarily successful enterprise. Methodologically, the 'other' is an unstable category. It cannot be seen merely as the neutral indicator of a space 'beyond' -be that semantic, geographic, political or otherwise. The term 'Other', when employed in twenty-first century critical endeavours, is always already embedded in a network of trace and association from which it cannot be recovered, pristine and ready, for whatever work we desire it to do. Thus, the Other is already and immutably tied to the discourse of psychoanalysis, as that which Jacques Lacan postulates as the unattainable object of desire. In this arguably unhappy scenario, subjectivity plays itself out in a frantic striving to attain that from which the self is ultimately alienated (the Other) without succumbing to aphanisis, the loss of the signifier that the self invokes to sustain the phantasy of wholeness. Or, to cite Julia Kristeva, the Other is the abject. The abject is that category of phenomena that the self must expel, be it either as 'defilement, sewage and muck' 29 or the fear of the outsider in the form of the stranger, in order to live. Similarly, the generic Other already references the 'Other' of linguistic poststructuralism -the elusive semiotic element that is endlessly deferred ensuring that the sign remains persistently incomplete. Poststructuralism has also underwritten the discursive and political restitution of subaltern subjectivities -those othered subjects in excess of Enlightenment rationality, masculinity, heterosexuality and whiteness. Lastly, albeit inexhaustively, these projections intermingle with the Other of the anthropological 'interview', the judicial Other of Althusser's interpellative encounter and, perhaps a little unfashionably now, Satre's existential Other. The Other, as such, is a dirty word, perhaps beyond a productive rehabilitation.
The dependence on the Other to concretise Britishness also has the consequence of demanding that the primary term remain internally consistent. Colley acknowledges the conceptual and political implausibility of this arrangement in an unexpected and somewhat strident paragraph toward the essay's conclusion, where she writes that: I am not, for one moment, suggesting that their shared imperial obsession, and shared access to imperial booty, invariably concealed from Britons their own internal divisions -the cultural splits among Englishness, Irishness, Scottishness and Welshness, the gaps in experience and sympathy among different regions, social classes and religious groupings and between the sexes. But Empire did serve as a powerful distraction and cause in common. 30 While this complication is certainly challenging, I am yet to realise a way in which the model of Britishness that Colley has outlined could accommodate such variables whilst resisting collapse. Certainly Colley herself provides no example as to how a model of Britishness so deeply reliant on internal consistency could integrate a minority or contestatory position. Her treatment of Ireland demonstrates, to a certain extent, the limitations of this paradigm for working through gradations or liminalities of Britishness. Ireland, despite its long established economic and governmental ties to England and its cultural relation to Gaelic regions through Scotland, is positioned as outside the 'national ' Although I find Colley's speculations problematic, there is much in her analysis that is admirable: an unwillingness to allow Britishness to be synonymous with Englishness; a sensitivity to local and regional experience; and a distrust of easy nationalisms. She is committed to demonstrating that Britishness was both an imaginative fiction and an energetic political identity, aware to a certain degree of its own artifice. Yet at the argument's conclusion we are reminded again of what has to be effaced (or at the very least obscured, if not suppressed) in order that her thesis appear coherent and successful. Referring to the emergence of a new British elite, Colley acknowledges the 'Rich, landed, and talented males from Wales, Scotland, England, and to a lesser extent Ireland [who] became welded after the 1770s into a single ruling class that intermarried, shared the same outlook and took to the business of governing, fighting for, and profiting from greater Britain'. 32 Is there room in this schema for Britains who were neither wealthy, propertied nor educated? In short, where is the working class? Could the working class, along with the Irish, represent the dilemma of the phenotypically similar non-white? The nonBritish in white skin? A degree of support for this view can be found in Alistair Bonnett's study of the Victorian working class, 'How The British Working Class Became White: The Symbolic (Re)formation of Racialized Capitalism'. In a cogent and provocative argument to which I cannot entirely do justice to in this context, Bonnett contends that 'metaphorical and literal depictions of racial whiteness were employed as a new paradigm of class hierarchy' 33 and that such depictions were formulated in colonial and settler societies and exported back to the metropole. Initially, this mythical sense of whiteness was a bourgeois preserve, and the denial of 'authentic racial whiteness' 34 to the lower classes could be seen to be achieved through the employment of two specific strategies of deferral: (i) through the 'imaginative alignment' of the worker with the non-white; 35 and (ii) via the assertion that biological differences produced a 'literal racial distinction' between the lower, middle and upper classes. 36 However, as the imperial project advanced and the welfare state consolidated, white identity became progressively more accessible to the working class. Bonnett observes however, that this whiteness was not the whiteness of Bourgeois English exceptionalism, but a 'popularist identity connoting superiority, but also ordinariness, nation and community'. 37 Throughout this paper, it has been my intention to question the easy invocation of the Other in the construction of racial identities. In conclusion, I would posit that simply calling attention to existence of the binary itself or extrapolating its parameters is an inadequate response to the complications of binary thought. Writing of the tensions inherent in distinguishing a British history from the hegemonic narrative of English nationhood, Pocock advocates that the dyad England/Britain can be countenanced only through the cultivation of what he describes as a 'two-fold consciousness' that can accommodate the 'recogni[tion] that things happen in different places at the same time'. Interestingly, however, Pocock's dilemma cannot be satisfactorily resolved via the conjuring of yet another dualism, 'the two-fold consciousness'. The way out of the England/Britain impasse is through the summoning of a third term, to 'complicat[e] the original load-bearing structure [of the hierarchical binary] beyond recognition'. 38 That term, almost inevitably, is Ireland. The binary cannot be undone by inversion, or even by butterflying it -that is juxtaposing its terms horizontally rather than vertically. Pocock's two-fold consciousness must of necessity become trifold at the very least. Effectively, this is what Colley's analysis of Britishness and Otherness also demonstrates. Britishness relates to a mythical outside through, and on the condition of, the simultaneous presence of Protestantism. Without Protestantism, there is no Britishness. In this schema, Protestantism is the mechanism via which ethnic, linguistic, regional and political differences are sutured. Thus, when Britishness is set against Otherness, a third term is always already invoked, whether it is spoken or not.
In an essay entitled 'Who needs the nation? Interrogating "British History"', Antoinette Burton argues that the time of boundaries and Otherness has past and that:
What we need is conceptual work that 'turns on a pivot' rather than on the axis of inside/outside -an image which suggests not just a balancing act, but the kind of counter-clockwise historicising manoeuvre such subjects require in an era when national histories, unlike the pivot, seem unwilling or unable to budge. 39 Perhaps what is needed is a new venture in thought -a less anticipated, less wearied, conceptual nomenclature that will generate questions as yet unarticulated, or even entirely un-thought. The binary is a clumsy rhetorical and metaphysical device that overdraws distinctions and occludes the fuzzy logic of the borderline. It tempts us to repeat the exclusion of the 'middle', and to collude in the silencing of the 'third term' that animates the duality whilst contradicting the very terms of the logic it imposes. Perhaps the figure of the pivot, with its connotations of mobility and contingency, could frame a subtler mode of analysis. A 'counter-clockwise historicising manoeuvre' would not resolve the dilemma of the boundary, or provide a 'right' methodology for either the writing of history or the encounter of history and theory. It could, however, encourage us to reconsider and evaluate the rhetorical and taxonomical choices we make in the narration of both national and ethnico-racial belonging.
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